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Summary  findings
Business  cycles are less volatile in rich countries than in  different countries specialize. Kraay and Ventura focus
poor ones. They are also more synchronized with the  on two such asymmetries.
world cycle. Kraay and Ventura develop two alternative  The first, which they label the "competition bias"
but noncompeting  explanations for those facts.  hypothesis, is based on the idea that cross-country
Both explanations proceed from the observation that  differences in production  costs are more prevalent in
the law of comparative advantage causes rich and poor  high-tech industries, sheltering producers  from foreign
countries to specialize in the production  of different  conmpetition  and therefore  making them large suppliers
commodities. In particular, rich countries specialize in  in the markets for their products.
high-tech products  produced by skilled workers and poor  The second, which they label the "cyclical bias"
countries specialize in low-tech products produced  by  hypothesis, is based on the idea that production  costs in
unskilled workers.  low-tech industries may be more sensitive to the shocks
Cross-country differences in business cycles then arise  that drive business cycles.
as a result of asymmetries among the industries in which
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Figure  1, we have plotted  the standard  deviation  of per capita GDP growth  against
the log-level  of per  capita income  for a large  sample  of countries. We refer  to this
relationship  as the Volatility  Graph  and note  that it is downward-sloping,  meaning
that fluctuations  in per capita income  growth  are smaller  in rich countries  than in
poor ones. In the bottom  panel  of Figure  1, we have plotted  the correlation  of per
capita income  growth rates  with world  average  per  capita income  growth  (excluding
the country  in question)  against  the log-level  of per  capita income  for the same  set of
countries.  We refer  to this relationship  as the Comovement  Graph and note that it is
upward-sloping,  meaning  that fluctuations  in per capita  income  growth  are more
synchronized  with the world cycle  in rich  countries  than in poor ones.  Table 1, which
is self-explanatory,  shows that these  facts  are quite robust.  '
Here we develop  two alternative  but non-competing  explanations  for these
facts. Both explanations  rely  on the notion  that the law of comparative  advantage
causes rich  countries  to specialize  in "high-tech"  industries  that require  sophisticated
technologies  operated  by skilled  workers,  while  poor countries  specialize  in "low-
tech" industries  that require  traditional  technologies  operated  by unskilled  workers.
This pattem  of specialization  opens up  the possibility  that cross-country  differences
in business  cycles  are due to asymmetries  between  high-tech  and low-tech
industries.  For instance,  assume  that production  in high-tech  industries  is more
sensitive  to foreign  shocks  and less  sensitive  to domestic  shocks  than in low-tech
ones. It follows immediately  that production  in high-tech  industries,  and therefore  in
rich  countries,  would  be more  synchronized  with the world  cycle than in low-tech
ones.  Moreover,  to the extent  that foreign  shocks  are an average  of the domestic
shocks  of many  other  countries,  it is reasonable  to expect  that foreign  shocks  are
less volatile  than domestic  shocks.  As a result,  production  in high-tech  industries,
and therefore  in rich  countries,  would  also be less  volatile  than in low-tech  ones.
' Acemoglu  and  Zilibotti  (1997)  also  present  the  Volatility  graph.  We  are  unaware  of any  previous
reference  to  the  Comovement  graph.
1One explanation  of why industries  react  differently  to shocks  is based  on the
idea  that producers  in high-tech  industries  enjoy more  market  power  than producers
in low-tech  industries.  We refer  to this asymmetry  among  industries  as the
"competition  bias" hypothesis.  This bias would  occur,  for instance,  if differences  in
production  costs among  firms are more  prevalent  in high-tech  industries.  These  cost
differences  shelter  technological  leaders  from their  competitors  and make  them large
suppliers  in international  markets.
This competition  bias has implications  for how industries  react  to domestic
and foreign  shocks.  Consider  the effects  of a favourable  domestic  shock  that
reduces  unit costs in all industries.  Since producers  in high-tech  industries  are large
suppliers  in international  markets,  increases  in their production  lower prices,
moderating  the effects  of the shock.  Since producers  in low-tech  industries  are  small
suppliers  in world  markets,  increases  in their production  have little or no effect  on
their prices.  To the extent that the competition  bias is important,  one would therefore
expect  that high-tech  industries  are less  sensitive  to domestic  shocks  than low-tech
industries.  Consider  next  the effects  of a foreign  shock  that raises  production  and
income  abroad  and, as a result,  increases  demand  in all industries.  Since  producers
in high-tech  industries  are large  suppliers  in international  markets,  this shock is
translated  into a large  shift in their industry  demand  which leads  to large increases  in
production  and prices.  Since producers  in low-tech  industries  are small suppliers  in
international  markets,  this shock has a negligible  effect  on their industry  demand  as
most of the increase  in world  demand  is met by increases  in production  abroad.  To
the extent  that the competition  bias is important,  one would  therefore  expect  that
high-tech  industries  are more  sensitive  to foreign  shocks  than low-tech  industries.
Another  explanation  for why industries  react differently  to shocks  is based  on
the idea that unit  costs in low-tech  industries  might  be more  sensitive  to the shocks
that drive business  cycles  than  in high-tech  industries.  We refer  to this asymmetry
among  industries  as the "cyclical  bias"  hypothesis.  If business  cycles are driven  by
productivity  shocks,  this bias would  occur  if industry  productivity  is more  volatile in
low-tech  industries.  If business  cycles  are driven  by monetary  shocks,  this bias might
2arise if cash-in-advance  constraints  are more  prevalent  for firms in low-tech
industries.
This cyclical  bias also has implications  for how industries  react to domestic
and foreign  shocks.  Almost  by assumption,  the cyclical  bias implies  that favourable
domestic  shocks  reduce  unit  costs in low-tech  industries  more  than in high-tech
industries,  leading  to larger  increases  in production  in the former than  in the latter.
This is how the cyclical bias explains  why high-tech  industries  are less  sensitive  to
domestic  shocks  than low-tech  industries.  Less  obviously,  the cyclical  bias also
implies  that high-tech  industries  are more  sensitive  to foreign  shocks  than low-tech
industries.  To see this, consider  the effects  of a favourable  shock  that raises
production  and income  abroad.  The cyclical  bias implies  that worldwide  production  of
low-tech  products  increases  relative  to that of high-tech  products,  raising  the relative
price of high-tech  products.  From  the perspective  of the domestic  economy,  this
constitutes  a favourable  shock for producers  of high-tech  products  and an adverse
one for low-tech  producers.  As a result,  high-tech  industries  are more  sensitive  to
foreign  shocks  than low-tech  industries.
To analyze  these issues  we construct  a stylized  world  equilibrium  model  of
the cross-section  of business  cycles.  Inspired  by the work of Davis (1995),  we
consider  a world  in which  differences  in both  factor endowments  a la Heckscher-
Ohlin and industry  technologies  a la Ricardo  combine  to determine  a country's
comparative  advantage  and,  therefore,  the patterns  of specialization  and trade. We
subject  this world economy  to both  the sort of productivity  fluctuations  that have
been  emphasized  by Kydland  and Prescott  (1982),  and also to monetary  shocks  that
have real effects  since  firms face cash-in-advance  constraints.  We then characterize
the cross-section  of business  cycles  and find  conditions  under  which  the competition
and cyclical  biases  can be used  to explain  the evidence  in Figure 1. The model  is
simple enough  that we obtain  closed-form  solutions  for all the expressions  of
interest.  We also find that our results  hold even in the presence  of trade  frictions,
modelled  here as "iceberg"  transport  costs,  provided  that these  frictions  are not so
large  as to alter the pattem  of trade.  Also, we find that reductions  in transport  costs
3(globalization?)  magnify  cross-country  differences  in business  cycles. Finally,  we
show that the two hypotheses  under  consideration  have different  implications  for the
cyclical  properties  of the terms of trade. In principle,  these properties  can be used to
distinguish  between  the two hypotheses.  In practice,  however,  a first look at the data
yields conflicting  evidence.
The research  presented  here is related  to the large literature  on open-
economy  real business  cycle models,  surveyed  by Backus,  Kehoe  and Kydland
(1995)  and Baxter  (1995),  that explores  how productivity  shocks  are  transmitted
across  countries.  Our work also relates  to recent  work by Obsffeld  and Rogoff  (1995,
1998)  and Corsetti  and Pesenti  (1998)  that analyzes  the international  transmission
of monetary  shocks.  We differ from these  lines of research  in two ways. Instead  of
emphasizing  the aspects  in which business  cycles  are similar  across  countries,  we
focus on those aspects  in which they are different.  Instead  of focusing  primarily  on
the implications  of international  lending,  risk-sharing  and factor movements  for the
transmission  of business  cycles,  we emphasize  the role of commodity  trade.  2
The paper is organized  as follows. Section  1 develops  the basic model.
Section  2 explores  the properties  of a cross-section  of business  cycles  in the basic
model.  Section  3 extends  the model  by introducing  money.  Section  4 further  extends
the model by introducing  transport  costs.  Section  5 examines  some implications  of
the model  for cyclical  properties  of the terms of trade.  Section  6 concludes.
2 Previous  literature  on  business  cycles  in open  economies  typically  assumes  that  either  (a)  there  is a
single  commodity,  so  that  there  is no  commodity  trade  whatsoever,  or (b)  that  countries  are  completely
specialized  in the  production  of  differentiated  products.  Whether  such  models  provide  a good
description  of observed  trade  pattems  has  not  been  a major  concem  for  this  literature.  In  contrast,  the
model  presented  here  is  empirically  consistent  with  the  main  features  of observed  trade  patterns:  (a)  a
large  volume  of  trade  among  rich  countries  in  products  with  similar  factor  intensity  (intraindustry  trade);
(b)  substantial  trade  among  rich  and  poor  countries  in  products  with  different  factor  intensities
(interindustry  trade);  and  (c)  little  trade  among  poor  countries.
41. A Simple Model of Trade and Business  Cycles
We consider  a world with a continuum  of countries  with mass one;  two
industries,  which  we refer  to as the a- and 1-industries;  and two factors  of
production,  skilled  and unskilled  workers.  Countries  differ in their  technologies,  their
endowments  of skilled  and unskilled  workers and their level  of productivity.  In
particular,  each country  is defined  by a triplet  (g,8,7r),  where ,u  is a measure  of how
advanced  the technology  of the country  is, 8 is the fraction  of the population  that is
skilled,  and rc  is an index  of productivity.  We assume  that workers  cannot migrate
and that cross-country  differences  in technology  are stable,  so that  ,u  and 8 are
constant.  We generate  business  cycles  by allowing  the productivity  index  r to
fluctuate  randomly.
The a- and 13-industries  each contain  a continuum  of differentiated  products
of measure  one which  can be  traded at zero  cost. Firms  in the a-industry  use
sophisticated  technologies  that require  skilled  labour,  while  firms in the  3-industry
use traditional  technologies  that can be operated  by both skilled  and unskilled
workers.  Not surprisingly,  we shall find that rich  countres that have better
technologies  and a high proportion  of skilled  workers  export mainly a-products,  while
poor countries  that have worse  technologies  and a high proportion  of unskilled
workers  export  mainly  ,B-products.  To emphasize  the role of commodity  trade, we
rule out trade  in financial  instruments.  To simplify  the problem  further,  we also rule
out investment.  Jointly,  these assumptions  imply that countries  do not save.  3
The  model  presented  here  is related  to Kraay  and  Ventura  (1997).
5Preferences
Each  country  is populated  by  a continuum  of  consumers  who  differ  in  their
level  of skills  and  their  personal  opportunity  cost  of work,  or reservation  wage.  We
index  consumers  by  iE [1/y,oe)  and  assume  that  this  index  is distributed  according  to
this  Pareto  distribution:  P(i)  = 1- (y i)-,  with  X>O,  y>O.  A consumer  with  index  i
maximizes  the  following  expected  utility:
E|U({[a(  )]  .[10  - ]  (i)  .t  .dt  (1)
where  U(.)  is any  well-behaved  function;  I(i)  is an indicator  function  that  takes  value
1 if the  consumer  works  and  0 otherwise;  and  c (l)  and  c,(i)  are  the  following
consumption  indices  of a- and  g-products:
1  6-1  @-1  -1  1  -0-1
c  [c  (i)  =  fccz,i)6  dz  c,() =  |cO(zji)e*  dz  (2)
where  c.(z,i)  and  c,(z,i)  are  consumer  i's consumption  of variety  z of the a- and  J-
industries,  respectively.  The  elasticity  of substitution  between  industries  is one,  while
the  elasticity  of substitution  between  any  two  varieties  within  an industry  is 0,  with
0>1.
The  solution  to the  consumer's  problem  is quite  straighfforward.  Consumers
spend  a fraction  v of their  income  on a-products  and  a fraction  1-v on ,-products.
Moreover,  the  ratio  of spending  on  any  two a-products  z and  z' is  given  by
F(  p(z) 1i8 pPa(  () j  ; and  the ratio  of spending  on  any  two 13-products  z and  z' is
6p[(z') J  , where  p.(z) and p,(z) denote  the price of variety  z of the a- and ,B-
products,  respectively.  Finally,  consumers  work if and only if the applicable  wage
(skilled  or unskilled)  exceeds  a reservation  wage  of i '.
We express  all prices in terms of the ideal  consumer  price index, i.e.
v  1-v
&fPo  ((Z)1e  .dzl  (Z)be  *dzl  = 1. Let r(I,8,7t)  and w(p4A,7r)  be the wages
of skilled  and unskilled  workers  in a (g.,8,nc)-country.  Also, define  s(V,8,2r)  and u(g.,8,n)
to be the measure  of skilled  and unskilled  workers  that are employed.  Under  the
assumption  that the distribution  of skills and reservation  wages  are independent,  we
have that
S=  Y  (3)
(Y  )
Equations  (3)-(4)  show  that the fraction  of skilled  and unskilled  workers that are
x  (N. 
employed  are (-)  and  , respectively.  If the wage of any type of worker
reaches  y, the entire labour  force of that type is employed  and the labour  supply for
that type of workers  becomes  vertical.  Throughout,  we shall assume  that y is large
enough  so that this never happens.  Finally,  we note  that the wage-elasticity  of the
labour  supplies,  A, is the same  for both  types of workers  since it only depends  on
the dispersion  of reservation  wages.
7Firms  and  Technology
The  a-industry  uses  sophisticated  production  processes  that are  not
available  to all  countries  and  that  require  skilled  workers.  Let e  .a  *  dz (sX>O)  be
the  "best-practice"  unit  labour  requirements  to produce  one  unit  of a given  small  set
of a-products  of measure  dz. Let (1  +  'I)  *  e-6axff  *  dz (rn>Q)  be  the  "second-best'
technology  available  to produce  one  unit  of a given  small  set of a-products  of
measure  dz.  Let  ,u  be  the  measure  of a-products  in  which  a firm  located  in  a (p.,8,)-
country  owns  the  best-practice  technology.  We  can  interpret  ,u  a natural  indicator  of
how  advanced  the  technology  of a country  is.  Assume  further  that  the  set  of  a-
products  in which  two  or more  firms  share  best-practice  technology  has  measure
i  1
zero.  Jointly,  these  assumptions  imply  that 1  = f J *.  dF(1i,8),  where  F(p.,8)  is the
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time-invariant  joint  distribution  function  of ,u  and  8. We  shall  assume  throughout  that
',n is large  enough  so that  the  firms  that  have  the  best-practice  technology  are 'de
facto'  monopolists  in  the  market  for  their  products.  Therefore,  their  optimal  pricing
policy  is to set  a markup  over  their  unit  cost.  Symmetry  ensures  that  that  all  firms  in
the a-industry  of a (g,8,it)-country  set  the  same  price,  p.(g,8,i):
0()
P.  =  a.  r. e-E  (5) 0 -i
The n-industry  uses  traditional  technologies  that  are  available  in all  countries
and  can  be operated  by  both  skilled  and  unskilled  workers.  In particular,  e  a = .dz
(s=>O)  workers  of any  kind  are required  to produce  one  unit  of a given  small  set  of  3-
products  of measure  dz.  Since  all  firms  have  access  to the  same  technologies,  the
3-industry  is  competitive  and  prices  are  equal  to costs.  We  shall  assume  throughout
that  in  equilibrium  skilled  wages  are  high  enough  that  only  unskilled  workers  produce
83-products.'  Symmetry  ensures  that all firms in the  3-industry  of a (g,8,3r)-country  set
the same price,  p(g,,7r):
po = w  e  (6)
Two features  of this representation  of technology  play an important  role
throughout  the paper.  First,  the elasticity  of substitution  among  varieties 0 regulates
the extent to which  the competition  bias is important.  If 0 is low (high),  a-products
are perceived  as different  (similar)  by consumers  and,  as a result,  firms in the a-
industry  face weak (strong)  competition  from producers  of other  varieties  of  a-
products. As 0-4o,  the degree  of competition  in the a-industry  increases  and the
competition  bias disappears. Second,  the parameters Ea  and s5  regulate  the
importance  of the cyclical bias.  If  e.<eo (s£>£p),  unit costs  in the n-industry  (a-
industry)  are more  sensitive  to fluctuations  in productivity. As  e,  the cyclical
bias disappears.
Productivity Fluctuations
We generate  business  cycles  by assuming  that the productivity  index
fluctuates  randomly.  In particular,  we assume  that ic consists  of the sum of a global
component,  rl, and a country-specific  component,  7r-I.  We assume  that the global
and country-specific  components  are independent,  and moreover  that the country-
specific  components  are independent  across  countries. Both  the global and
country-specific  components  of productivity  are reflected  Brownian  motions  on the
interval  with zero  drift and instantaneous  variances aCdt  and (1  -a).dt
respectively,  where  7E  is a positive  constant  and 0<  cy<1  . These  assumptions  imply
4This  is  the  case  K  the  share  of spending  on  a-products  not  too  small,  i.e. v>>O.
9that the productivity  index ir follows  a Brownian  motion  with zero drift and unit
variance  reflected  on the interval [nI'  - 2l  + 2].  This interval  itself fluctuates  over
time as the global component  of productivity  changes.  Finally,  it is a well-known
result  of the theory  of reflected  Brownian  motion  that the invariant  distributions  of the
global and country-specific  components  of productivity,  G( n) and G(2-fI), are
uniform  on the interval [- 2 ' 2  We assume  that the initial  cross-sectional
distribution  of the country-specific  component  of productivity  is equal  to the invariant
distribution  and hence does not change  over  time.
From the perspective  of a (g,8,7t)-country,  we can refer  to changes  in 7 and ri
as as domestic  and foreign  productivity  shocks.  It is straighfforward  to show that the
instantaneous  correlation  between  these  shocks  is  V_G.8  That is, the parameter  a
regulates  the extent  to which  the variation  in domestic  productivity  is due to the
global  or country-specific  components,  i.e. whether  it comes  from d Fl or d(ir-11).
Figure  2 shows possible  sample  paths  of 7t under  three  different  assumptions
regarding  a. In the first panel,  we assume  that a=Q,  so that rI is constant  and all the
variation  in 7i is country-specific.  The second  panel  shows  the case in which a=1.
Then, dnr=drl  and all the variation  in 7 is global,  i.e. changes  in it are perfectly
correlated  with changes  in global productivity,  rI. The third panel  shows the case in
which O<a<1.  Then, the variation  in 7i is has  both country-specific  and global
components.
5See,  for instance,  Harrison  (1990),  Chapter  5.
6This  will  be  true  except  when  either-n  or rl are  reflected  at  their  respective  boundaries.  These  are  rare
events  since  the  dates  at  which  they  occur  constitute  a set  of  measure  zero  in  the  time  line.
10Equilibrium  Prices  and  Trade Flows
Let  p be  the  average  price  of an a-product  (or  the  ideal  price  index  of  the a-
industry)  relative  to the  average  price  of a  3-product  product  (or  the  ideal  price  index
of the 13-industry).  Then,  our normalization  rule  implies  that
1-  11
[  cc10  d  dzl  p1v  and [Po  ()1-0 .dzl  = Frv. Using  this  notation,  the
equilibrium  prices  of any a-product  and  ,B-product  produced  in a (p.,8,it)-country  are:
1+
Pa = X%P  *e  O+  (7)
Pp = p-v  (8)
where  X is a positive  constant. 
7 Since  each  country  is a "large"  producer  of its  own
varieties  of a-products,  the  price  of these  varieties  depends  negatively  on  the
quantity  produced.  Countries  with  many  skilled  workers  (high  8) with  relatively  high
productivity  (high  i-rl)  producing  a small  number  of varieties  (low ,u)  produce  large
quantities  of each  variety  of the a-products  and  as  a result,  face  low  prices.  As 0-4-,
the  dispersion  in  their  prices  disappears  and  p -*p"v.  In the  ,B-industry  all  products
e -1  1  1 F  o+R  o*2,-fl) '?In  particular,  =X  f11  f(.g  eF e  a  .dF(A, 8).dG(ir-  ),whichis
constant  given  that  the  distributions  F and  G  are  time-invariant.  To  derive  Equation  (7),  equate  the
ratio  of world  expenditure  on  the  (sum  of  all) a-products  of  a (g,8,n)-country  and  a (p±',8',n')-country  to
the  ratio  of  the  value  of  productions.  Second,  use  Equations  (3)-(6)  to find  that:
I1+ o-  E+X  - st'7C-7'
pa' = Pa(.  .e+  a  . Finally,  substitute  this  expression  in  the  ideal  price  index
of  the  a-industry  and  solve  for p.. Equation  (8)  is simply  a consequence  of our  normalization  rule  and
the  observation  that  all P-products  command  the  same  price  in  equilibrium.
11must command  the same  price.  Otherwise,  low-price  varieties  of ,8-products  would
not be produced  in equilibrium.  Finally,  we find that the equilibrium  value for p is:
p  =  e(8-  )  e  (9)
where  r is another  positive  constant.  8 In the presence  of a cyclical  bias, c<F
(c.>£,  high  productivity  is associated  with high (low) relative  prices  for a-products  as
the world supply  of 1-products  is high (low) relative  to that of a-products.  As £a<£p
the cyclical  bias disappears  and the relative  prices of both industries  are unaffected
by the level  of productivity.
Let y(&,B,Sr)  and x(~L,8,7)  be the income  and the share in production  of the a-
industry,  i.e. y=rs+w-.u  and x =  . Not  surprisingly,  countries  with good
y
technologies  (high ,u)  and a high proportion  of skilled  workers  (high 8) have high
values  for both  y and x. We therefore  refer  to countries  with high values of x as rich
countries.  Since each country  produces  an infinitesimal  number  of varieties  of  a-
products  and consumes  all of them, all countries  export  almost  all of their  production
of a-products  and import  almost  all of their consumption  of  a-products.  As a share of
income,  these exports  and imports  are x and v, respectively.  This kind of trade  is
usually  referred  to as intraindustry  trade,  since it involves  two-way  trade in products
with  similar  factor intensities.  To balance  their trade,  countries  with x< v export  ,B-
products  and countries  with x>v import  them. As a share of income,  these exports
and imports  are v-x and x-v, respectively.  This kind of trade  is usually  referred  to as
interindustry  trade or factor-proportions  trade. As a result,  the model  captures  in a
stylized  manner  three  broad  empirical  regularities  regarding  the patterns  of trade: (a)
8 n particular, iv  *  X  =  . 1  JfJ(-o)e  *dl=(p,  8) *  dG(iT  - rl) .
I1-cv  c 00
To  derive  Equation  (8),  we equate  the  ratio  of  spending  in  both  industries  to  the  ratio  of  worldwide
production  of  both  industries  and  then  use  Equations  (3)-(7)  to solve  for p.
12a large volume  of intraindustry  trade  among rich  countries,  (b) substantial  inter-
industry  trade  between  rich and poor countries,  and (c) little  trade among  poor
countries.
132.  The  Cross-section  of Business  Cycles
In the world  economy  described  in the previous  section,  countries  are subject
to two kinds  of shocks.  On the one hand, domestic  productivity  shocks  shift industry
supplies.  On the other  hand, foreign  productivity  shocks  shift industry  demands.  In
the presence  of the competition  bias or the cyclical bias,  these  shocks  have different
effects  in high-tech  and low-tech  industries.  As a result,  the aggregate  response  to
similar  shocks  differs across  economies  with different  industrial  structures.  In other
words,  the properties  of the business  cycles  that countries  experience  depend  on
the determinants  of their industral  structure,  that is, on their factor endowments  and
technology.
Domestic  and Foreign  Shocks  as a Source  of Business  Cycles
The (demeaned)  growth  rate of income  in a (gi,8,n)-country  can be written  as
a linear  combination  of domestic  and foreign  shocks:  9
dIny - E[dIny] = 4r *  dn  +  dtr  *  dll  (10)
The functions Q,(18,it) and  t.(18,7r)  measure  the sensitivity  of a country's
growth rate  to domestic  and foreign shocks,  and are given  by:
in  =  (  + A)  -[X  - a  1B  + (1  - x) eco  (1  1  )
=(1+x)  -X  a  +(x-V)  (Ea-e)P  (12)
9To  see  this,  apply  Ito's  lemma  to  the  definition  of income  and  use  the  expressions  for  equilibrium
factor  prices  and  supplies  in  Equations  (3)-(9).
14Equations  (1  0)-(1  2) provide  a complete  characterization  of the business  cycles
experienced  by a (t,S,r)-country. Moreover,  they show how business  cycles  differ
across  countries,  since the sensitivity  of growth rates  to domestic  and foreign  shocks
depends  on the share in production  of high-tech  products,  x.  Finally,  we note the
detrended  growth rate of world average  income,  Y, is given by
dinY -E[dInY] = or - drl  (13)
where the sensitivity  of the world  growth rate to innovations  in the global  component
of productivity  is given by:
xn  = (1+X).(v*a  +(1-v)  £P)  (14)
Let  V(g,8,n)  denote  the standard  deviation  of the growth  rate of a ( g,8,7r)-
country,  and let C(p.,8,nr)  denote  the correlation  of its growth  rate with wodd average
income  growth.  These are  the theoretical  analogs  to the Volatility  and Comovement
graphs  in Figure  1. Using  Equations  (1  0)-(1  4) and the properties  of the shocks,  we
defive the following  result:  10
'° The  proof  is simple,  since  we  have  closed-form  solutions  for  both  the  volatility  and  comovement
statistics:  V=4 (1-o).2+a  (41 +  H)2 andC=  (  )  . Since  4,+4.
1(1  - a),  2 + a.  (4  +  ir)2
does  not  depend  on  x, V  (C)  will  be  downward  (upward)  sloping  if and  only  if E,  is decreasing  in  x. The
proposition  describes  the  sign  of  7c for  different  parameter  values.
15PROPOSITION  1: The functions  C and V depend,  at most,  on x. Moreover:
(i) If E{=  = £=a  *O-  then TX  = ax =  0  for all x;
(ii) If E  >Ea  00  x  then a  <0 and  -C >0 for  all  x; and
0  + ),  ax  ~  ax
(iii) If sp < £a  *  then  V>0  -and  C< oforallx.
O+X  ax  ax
This is the first of a series of results  that relate  a country's  industrial  structure,
as measured  by x, to the properties  of its business  cycles.  Proposition  1 says that
the theoretical  Volatility  and Comovement  graphs  have  the same  slopes as their
empirical  counterparts  if the competition  bias (low 0) and/or  the cyclical  bias (e5>Qa)
are  strong enough.  Equations  (11)-(1  2) show  that this same parameter  restriction
implies  that rich  countries  are less  sensitive  to domestic  shocks  (i.e.  ,,  is decreasing
with x), but more  sensitive  to foreign  shocks  (i.e.  ;  is increasing  with x). In the
remainder  of this section  we provide  intuition  for this result.
Why Are Rich Countries Less Sensitive To Domestic Shocks?
Domestic  shocks  shift industry  supplies.  When  these  shocks  are positive,
they raise production,  wages  and employment  in both industries.  When negative,
they lower production,  wages  and employment.  However,  to the extent that the
competition  bias and the cyclical  bias are important,  these  effects  are larger in the  1-
industry  than  the a-industry.
It is useful  to start  with a benchmark  case in which 0-oo and  so that
neither  the competition  bias nor the cyclical  bias are present.  A favourable
productivity  shock results  in an increase  in productivity  of magnitude C*dn  in both
industries,  and has  two familiar  effects. Holding  constant  employment,  increased
productivity  directly raises  production  and hence  income.  This is nothing  but the
16celebrated  Solow  residual  and consists  of the sum of the growth rates  of productivity
of both sectors,  weighted  by their  shares  in production,  i.e. E.dn. Increased  factor
productivity  also raises  the wages  of skilled  and unskilled  workers and,  as a result,
employment,  output  and income  rse further.  This contribution  of employment  growth
to the growth rate of income  is measured  by Xs-sd7t,  and its strength  depends  on  the
elasticity  of the labour  supply  to changes  in wages, X. Favourable  domestic  shocks
therefore raise  growth rates  in all countries  by the same  magnitude,  i.e. (1+ X)  E-dt.
To see how the competition  bias determines  how a country reacts  to
domestic  shocks,  assume  that 6 is finite  and se=sfi=.  As in the benchmark  case,
favourable  domestic  shocks  raise  productivity  equally  in the a- and ,-industries,
raising  wages,  employment  and output.  This is captured  by the term (1  + X) c-dn as
before.  However,  since the country  is large  in the markets  for its a-products,
increases  in the supply  of a-products  are met with reductions  in prices that lower
production  and income.  This stabilizing  effect  of prices  is measured  by the term
-x. (1+  )  )  s dr.  The more  inelastic  is the demand  faced  by each a-product  (the
lower is 0) and the larger  is the share of the a-industry  (the larger  is x), the more
important  is this stabilizing  role of prices.  Since rich  countries  have larger a-
industries,  domestic  shocks  have smaller  effects  on their growth rates,  i.e.
(  )  (~  O+X)
To see how the cyclical  bias determines  how a country  responds  to domestic
shocks,  assume  that 0--oo  and s,<e,.  Now domestic  shocks  raise productivity  in the
a-industry  by P-s.dn,  and in the ,3-industry  by F-*di.  As a result, both  the Solow
residual  and the employment  effect  will be smaller  in the a-industry  than in the f-
industry.  Since rich countries  have larger a-industries,  domestic  shocks  have smaller
17effects  on their growth  rates, i.e. (1  + X)  *.[x*a  +(1-X).s p]. dit.  Clearly,  if  >  the
converse  will be true.
To sum up, in all countries  domestic  productivity  shocks  shift outwards  the
supplies  of a- and ,8-products.  Since rich  countries  produce  mainly  high-tech
products,  they face inelastic  industry  demands  (i.e. the competition  bias) and
experience  relatively  small shifts in supplies  (i.e. the cyclical  bias).  As a result,  the
effects  of domestic  shocks  on income  are small in rich  countries.  Poor  countries,  by
virtue  of producing  primarily  low-tech  products,  face elastic  industry  demands  and
experience  relatively  large shifts in supplies.  This is why  the effects  on income  of
domestic  shocks  are large in poor countries.
Why Are Rich Countries More Sensitive to Foreign Shocks?
Foreign  shocks  shift industry  demands.  For instance,  positive  shocks  raise
production  and income  in the rest of the world, increasing  demand  for all products.
Whether  this leads  to an increase  in the demand  for the domestic  industry  depends
on the extent  to which the increase  in demand  is met by an increase  in production
abroad.  To the extent  that the competition  bias and the cyclical  bias are important,
the increase  in the demand  for the a-industry  is always  larger than that of the ,B-
industry.
It is useful to start again  with  the benchmark  case in which neither  the
competition  bias nor the cyclical  bias are present,  i.e. 0e-°  and sa=s=s.  A favourable
foreign  shock consists  of an increase  in average  productivity  abroad  of magnitude
£*drl in both industries  and therefore  raises  worldwide  demand  and production  of
both a- and 1-products.  However,  it follows  from Equation  (12) that this has no effect
in the domestic  economy.  The reason  is simple and follows  from three assumptions.
First,  the assumption  of homothetic  preferences  ensures  that, at given prices,  the
relative  demands  for both types  of products  are unaltered  as income  grows.  Second,
18the assumption  that Sa=S  ensures  that, at given prices,  the relative  supplies  of both
industries  are unaltered  as productivity  grows.  Third, our assumption  that 0-+o
ensures  that consumers  are very willing  to switch  their consumption  expenditures
over different  varieties  of products.  The first two assumptions  mean  that the
increases  in the foreign  supplies  of both  industries  match  exactly  the increase  in
demands  for both industries.  This is why p does not change  (recall  Equation  (9)).
The third assumption  means  that despite  the change  in relative  supplies  of different
varieties  of a-products,  there  are no changes  in their relative  prices.
To see how the competition  bias affects  how a country  reacts  to foreign
shocks,  assume  that 0 is finite and  =  It is still true that after a favourable
foreign  shock  the increases  in the foreign  supplies  of both industries  match exactly
the increase  in demands  at the industry  level. As a result  p is not affected.  However,
since the increase  in demand  for domestic a-products  is not matched  by increased
production  abroad,  the price of these  varieties  increases.  This stimulates  wages,
employment  and production  in the a-industry.  This effect is measured  by
x  (1+X--  . *  di,  and is larger  the more inelastic  is the demand  faced  by each a-
product (the lower  is 0) and the larger is the share of the a-industry  (the larger  is x).
Since rich  countries  have larger a-industries,  foreign  shocks  have larger effects  on
their growth rates.
To see how the cyclical  bias determines  how a country  react  s to foreign
shocks,  assume  that 0.-*  and s,<s0.  At given prices,  we have now that a favourable
foreign  shock raises  the world  supply of a-products  (,8-products)  by less (more)  than
its demand.  As a result,  there is an excess  demand  for a-products  and an excess
supply of 13-products  that leads  to an increase  in p (recall Equation  (9)). From  the
point  of view of the country,  this is an increase  in the demand  for the domestic a-
industry  and a decrease  in the demand  for the domestic 1-industry.  These  demand
shifts raise  wages, employment  and production  in the a-industry,  while lowering
19them in the ,8-industry.  The combined  effect  in both  industries  is measured  by
(1  + X)  *  (x - v) *  (sp - sa)and  its sign depends  on whether  the country  is a net
exporter  of ca-  or 13-products.  Since rich  countries  have larger a-industries,  foreign
shocks  have larger  effects  on their  growth rates.
To sum up, foreign  shocks  shift the demands  of both industries  at home.
Since rich  countries  have a larger  share of high-tech  products,  they have little
competition  from foreign  suppliers  (i.e. the competition  bias) and specialize  in
industries  whose  prices move  with  the world  cycle (i.e. the cyclical  bias).  As a result,
effects  of foreign  shocks  are positive  and large. Poor  countries  produce  low-tech
products  and,  as a result,  face stiff competition  form abroad  and specialize  in
products  whose price moves  against  the world  cycle. As a result,  the effects  of
foreign  shocks  are less positive  than  in rich  countries,  and they might  even be
negative.
20The Role  of Commodity  Trade
In this  model,  the  properties  of business  cycles  differ  across  countries
because  countries  have  different  industrial  structures,  as  measured  by  x. There  are
many  determinants  of the  industrial  structure  of a country.  We  focus  here  on
perhaps  the  most  important  of such  determinants,  that  is,  a country's  ability  to trade.
In fact,  if we deny  this  ability  to the  countries  that  populate  our  theoretical  world,  their
business  cycles  would  have  identical  properties.  In  a world  of autarky,  x=  v in every
country  and  commodity  prices  are  determined  by domestic  conditions.  In such  a
world  the  sensitivities  of growth  rates  to domestic  and  foreign  shocks  would  be  the
same  in  all  countries,  tA = (1  + X)*  [v.  *  + (1- v). sr3]  and tA =  0; and  the  Volatility
and Comovement  graphs  would  be flat, VA = (1+)[v  ea +(1-v)e]  and
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Moving  from  a world  of autarky  to a world  of free  trade  affects  the  industrial
structure  of countries  since  in free  trade  the relative  prices  of those  products  in
which  a country  has  comparative  advantage  are  higher  than  in autarky.  Higher
prices  imply  higher  industry  shares,  even  if production  remains  constant.  But  one
would  also  expect  higher  prices  to stimulate  employment  and  production.  These
increases  in employment  could  come  from  unemployment,  as is  the  case  in  the
model  presented  here.  Or  they  could  come  from  employment  in other  industries,  as
it would  be  the  case  if we  changed  our  assumptions  and  allowed  both  industries  to
use  both  types  of workers.
'1 This  result  depends  on  the  assumption  that  the  elasticity  of substitution  between  a-products  and  0-
products  is one. Otherwise,  industrial  structures  would  also  be  different  in autarky  and  the  crss-
section  of  business  cycles  would  exhibit  some  variation.
213. Monetary  Policy
In this section  we extend the model  by introducing  monetary  shocks  as an
additional  source  of business  cycles  fluctuations.  As is customary  in the literature  on
money  and business  cycles,  we assume  that monetary  policy is erratic.  This
simplification  is adequate  if one takes the  view that monetary  policy has  objectives
other  than stabilizing  the cycle. For instance,  if the inflation  tax is used to finance  a
public  good,  shocks  to the marginal  value  of this public  good are  translated  into
shocks  to the rate of money  growth.  Alternatively,  if a country  is committed  to
maintaining  a fixed parity,  shocks  to foreign investors'  confidence  in the country  are
translated  into shocks  to the nominal  interest  rate,  as the monetary  authorities  use
the latter to manage  the exchange  rate.
We motivate  the use of money  by assuming  that firms face a cash-in-
advance  constraint.  12  In particular,  firms have  to use  cash in order to pay a fraction
of their  wage payments  before  production  starts.  Firms borrow  cash  from the
government  and repay  the cash  plus interest  after production  is completed  and
output  is sold to consumers.  Monetary  policy  consists  of setting the interest  rate on
cash, and then distributing  the proceeds  or losses in a lump-sum  fashion  among
consumers.  Increases  in the interest  rate raise  the financing  costs of firms, reducing
wages,  employment  and output.  In this model,  interest  rate shocks  are therefore
formally  equivalent  to supply  shocks  such as changes  in production  or payroll  taxes.
The Model  with Money
Let t be the interest  rate  on cash. Since monetary  policy  varies across
countries,  each country  is now defined  by a quadruplet  (  ,8,i,t).  We construct  the
12 See Christiano,  Eichenbaum  and  Evans  (1997)  for  a discussion  of related  models.
22process  for interest  rate  shocks  following  the same  steps  we used to construct  the
process  for productivity  shocks  in Section  1. The interest  rate t consists  of two
independent  pieces:  a global  component,  I, and a country-specific  component,  t-I.
Moreover,  the country-specific  components  are independent  across  countries.  Both
the global  component  and the country-specific  components  of interest  rates  are
reflecting  Brownian  motions  on the interval [,  2  with  zero drift and
instantaneous  variances  4-dt and (1-0).dt  respectively,  where  i  is a positive  constant
and 0<c<1. These  assumptions  imply  that the interest  rate t is a Brownian  motion
with zero drift and unit  variance  reflected  on the interval [I -2  ,I +2].  The initial
cross-sectional  distribution  of the country-specific  components,  H( i-I), is uniform  on
[-2  2and  hence  does not change  over  time. From  the perspective  of a ( g,8,7t,l)-
country,  we define  d  t and dI as domestic  and foreign  interest  rate shocks  and note
that their  correlation  coefficient  is  ro . Finally,  productivity  shocks  and interest  rate
shocks  are assumed  to be independent.
The introduction  of monetary  policy  leads  to minor changes  in the equilibrium
of the model.  Since  cash-in-advance  constraints  only affect  firms,  the consumer's
problem  is not altered  and both  the spending  rules  and the labour  supplies  in
Equations  (3)-(4) remain  valid. Regarding  firms,  we assume  that a fraction  of wage
payments  ic. and x, in the ax-  and r-industries  have  to be made in cash before
production  starts. Consequently,  the costs of producing  a small set of products  of
measure  dz include  not only the unit labour  requirements,  e-Eo  .*  dz and
e-p  n .*dz, but also the financing  costs, eKa  dz and eKO  l *  dz .13  As a result,
Equations  (5)-(6)  have to be replaced  by:
13 We are using  the following  approximations  here: Ycl.tm4n(1  +ix.t)  and ;.tln(1  +iy).
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'"R1C'tl  (15)
p=  w - (16)
An interesting  novelty  of the  model  with  money  is  that  it indicates  another
potential  source  for  the  cyclical  bias.  Even  if productivity  is equally  volatile  in both
industries,  i.e.  e.=sp  unit  costs  could  still  be  more  volatile  in  the  3-industry  if the
cash-in-advance  constraint  is more  binding  there,  i.e. K,>K.. Finally,  a straighfforward
extension  of the  arguments  in Section  1 can  be  used  to show  that Equation  (8) is  still
valid,  while  Equations  (7)  and  (9) must  be  replaced  by:  14
p. =  -P  p1-v  )  e  (17)
Equations  (1  5)-(18)  are  natural  generalizations  of Equations  (5), (6), (7) and
(9). As the  cash-in-advance  constraints  become  less  important,  i.e. KO-+O  and  Kp+O,
this  model  converges  to the  model  without  money  presented  in Section  1.
14 The constants  X  and  ir are  now  given  by:
x  fI+  . f fX  dF(p,  8). dG(n  -II)  dH(K  -I)
-c-00 00
vI+x  e+x  v  .(,E  (  |  +|(1)  e  dF(u,  8). dG(-  I)  dH(i  -I)
l-v  2  -c -00
24Properties  of Business  Cycles
With  the  addition  of interest  rate  shocks,  income  growth  in  the  (t,8,it,t)-
country  is given  by  this  generalization  of Equation  (10):  tS
diny-E[dIny]=t.  d7r+t 11drl-  . dt-tI  -dI  (19)
where j,8,u;t)  and  M 0 (,8,it,)  are  still  defined  by Equations  (11)-(1  2) and ,(,u,t)
and  ,(A,8,n,t),  which  measure  the  sensitivity  of income  growth  to domestic  and
foreign  interest  rate  shocks,  are  given  by:
~t1=  X  XKa  +  (1-X)  K]  (20)
AI=X{X.Ka  +  3+  (X-V)  (15  Ka)j  (21)
Equations  (1  1)-(12)  and  (19)-(21)  provide  a complete  characterization  of the
business  cycles  of a (g,8,7,tL)-country.  As  Kac.*0  and  ic-*0, we  have  that k,+0 and
t,-40 and  business  cycles  are  driven  only  by productivity  shocks.  As £-+X0 and  s,-+O,
we  have  that E  O0  and n-+O and  business  cycles  are  driven  only  by  interest  rate
shocks.  In the  general  case,  however  business  cycles  result  from  the  interaction  of
both  type  of shocks.
A comparison  of (20)-(21)  with  (1  1)-(12)  reveals  that  the  effects  of domestic
and  foreign  monetary  shocks  are  very  similar  to those  of productivity  shocks.  As
mentioned  earlier,  differences  in  the  prevalence  of cash-in-advance  constraints
provide  an altemative  source  of cyclical  bias,  i.e. ia  and  iN play  the  same  role  in (20)
and  (21) as  Ea and  Pe,  do  in (11)  and  (12).  In contrast  to productivity  shocks,  however,
'5  To  compute  income,  remember  that  financing  costs  are  not  really  a cost  for  the  economy  as  a whole
but  a transfer  from  firms  to  consumers  via  the  govemment.
25monetary  shocks  only have indirect  effects  on production  through  their effects  on
wages  and labour  supplies. Therefore,  the sensitivity  of income  growth  to monetary
shocks  is smaller,  i.e. the term (1  +X) which  premultiplies  (11) and (12)  is replaced
with X.
Since  we now have two sources of business  cycles,  world average  growth  is
given  by:
dInY - E[dlnY] = (Odndl -o)  dl  (22)
where  co, is still defined  by Equation  (14)  while co,  is given by:
'I  =IX[V ' K  + (1  - V)  Kp]  (23)
26If productivity  shocks  are negligible,  i.e. c,=s,=0, we have the following
result:' 6
PROPOSITION  2: The functions  C and V depend,  at most,  on x. Moreover:
o-i  av  ac (i) If KP, =I  -- I then -=-  = 0 for all x;
~~+X  ax  ax
(ii) If  cp  > Ka  0  ,  then - < 0 and -C > 0 for all x; and O+X,  ax  ~~ax
(ii) If KP, <Ka  0  X-,then  a  >0  and  a- <0  forallx.
aO+X,  ax  ax
Proposition  2 is the natural  analog  to Proposition  1 in a world in which
business  cycles  are driven  only by interest  rate shocks.  The competition  and cyclical
biases  cause cross-country  differences  in business  cycles,  regardless  of whether  the
cycles are driven  by productivity  shocks  or interest  rate shocks.  The intuition  of why
the competition  bias and the cyclical  bias generate  these pattems  in a cross-section
of business  cycles has been  discussed  at length  in Section  2 and need not be
repeated  here. Instead,  we generalize  Propositions  1 and 2 to the case where  both
productivity  shocks  and interest  rate shocks  drive business  cycles,  as follows: "
'6 Notethatinthiscase  V = I(,  t )  +  a.  (t+1)2  and C=  (2  I)+.  )2
The proof  is analogous  to that of Proposition  1.
'7  Note  that V =  (,_  +  - O  2  2
I5C0l  't  +n)  +0'@  '(t  +0-t  L41)n
C=  ,(r  l)  -(4  i)  . Since  neither
|  co2 + 0 -)2 ((2  - )  t2  + a  (£f1:  + trl)2  + (I _  0). t2 + 0. (it + 41)2)
E_+t. nor £,+ depend  on x, V (C) is  downward  (upward)  sloping  if and  only if (1- a)  2 + (1-  -)  t2
is decreasing  (increasing)  in x. The  proposition  describes  the  sign  of a-((1- °)  -L- (1- 0  £ )for
different  parameter  values.
27PROPOSITION  3: The functions  C and V depend,  at most, on x. Moreover,  if
aV <0  ( aV >  0),  then aC >0  ( ac < 0). Define: TX  a-x  ax  ax
A = (1-_ r) *  (1  + ),)2 *  (£  1  * 8  -£  + (1  _  *2  *  Ka  *  0-X  - IC  ).  O A=(1_  C). (1  +X)2{c-  o  J.X2+(  0K IKK1c3
Then,
(i) If A>0, aV  > 0 for all x; ax
(ii) if -B￿￿0,  a￿  <0  ( a- >0)  if x<-  A  (xŽ-  A ); and
ax  a  X  B  Bg
(iii) if A<-B,  then 'V  < 0 for all x.
Proposition  3 provides  a set of necessary  and sufficient  conditions  for the
functions  V and C to exhibit  the same  slopes  than  their empirical  counterparts.  Let.x*
be the highest  value  for x in a cross-section  of countries.  Then, a necessary  and
sufficient  condition  for business  cycles  to be less  volatile  and more  synchronized
with  the world  cycle in rich  countries  is that A+B-  x*<0.  This condition  is always
satisfied  if both  types of shocks  generate  industry  responses  with the right biases,
i.e. £  >  ,, * 0  X  and KO >Ka  *  i  X . But this is not a necessary condition. For
instance,  it might  be that the a-industry  is more  sensitive  to domestic  productivity
(interest  rate)  shocks  and less sensitive  to foreign  productivity  (interest  rate)  shocks
than the 13-industry,  S-  < sa  * o  X  (K  < Ka  * 0  - ), yet still business  cycles are
+X  0+ X
less  volatile  and more  synchronized  with the world cycle  in rich  countries.  This
naturally  requires  that the a-industry  be less  sensitive  to domestic  interest  rate
(productivity)  shocks  and more  sensitive  to foreign interest  rate (productivity)  shocks,
0-1  0-1
KO >Ka  -O+X  (e0  > -a  +2
284. Trade Integration
The postwar  period  has seen large reductions  in both physical  and policy
barriers  to commodity  trade. Here we do not attempt  to explain  these  changes  but
instead  explore  how parametric  reductions  in transport  costs affect  the cross-section
of business  cycles.  Throughout,  we assume  that transport  costs are small enough
relative  to cross-country  differences  in factor endowments  that all countries  are
either net importers  or net exporters  of the ,8-product,  for any value of their domestic
productivity  and interest  rates, and for all possible  equilibrium  prices. Moreover,  we
assume  that transport  costs are small enough  relative  to cross-country  differences  in
technology  in the a-industry  that every  a-product  continues  to be produced  in only
one country.  These  assumptions  ensure  that the pattern  of trade is unchanged  by
the introduction  of transport  costs, although  the volume  of trade is negatively  related
to the size of transport  costs.
Remember  that the main theme  of this paper is that the nature  of business
cycles  a country  experiences  depends  on its industrial  structure.  As transport  costs
decline,  the prices  of products  in which  a country  has  comparative  advantage
increase  and, as a result,  the share in production  of these industries  increases.  A
natural  conclusion  of this argument  is that one should  expect  that reductions  in
transport  costs (globalization?)  increase  the cross-country  variation  in the properties
of business  cycles.  We confirm  this intuition  here.
The Model  with Transport  Costs
We generalize  the model  with money by assuming  that trade incurs  transport
costs of the "iceberg"  variety,  i.e. if r>1 units  of output  are shipped  across  borders,
only one unit arrives  at the destination  while r-1 units "melt' in transit. Let p.(z) and
p,(z) now denote  the f.o.b. or intemational  price of variety  z of the a-products  and of
29the  3-products,  respectively.  We use the same normalization  rule as before  in terms
of these international  prices,  and define  p as as the average  f.o.b. price of  a-
products  relative  to f-products.  The presence  of transport  costs implies  that the c.i.f.
or domestic  product  prices  vary across  countries.  In each country,  the c.i.f. prices  of
imports  and import-competing  products  are higher  than the f.o.b. prices  while  the
c.i.f. prices  of exports  are  equal  to the f.o.b. prices.  Since countries  import  all the
varieties  of a-products  they do not produce,  the c.i.f. price of all but the infinitesimal
measure  , of domestically-produced  a-products  is t* pA(z).  Similarly,  the c.i.f. price of
f3-products  is c-p,(z)  if the country  is a net importer  of 1-products,  and p,(z)
otherwise.
Note  that the consumer  continues  to allocate  consumption  expenditures
(evaluated  at c.i.f. prices)  over  commodities  exactly  as before.  The consumers
labour  supply  decision  is also unchanged:  consumers  work if and only if the
applicable  wage,  expressed  in terms of a unit of consumption,  exceeds  their
reservation  wage. However,  since consumers  located  in different  countries  face
different  c.i.f. prices,  the price of a unit of consumption  now varies across  countries.
Let pc(g,8,ir,t)  denote  the ideal  price index  of consumption  in a ( g,8,7r,t)-country.  This
index is given by X if the country  is a net importer  of the 13-product,  and V
otherwise.18  Therefore,  we need  to replace  Equations  (3)-(4)  by the following
generalizations:
Y Pc  .t  r  )  (24)
u=  (  (25)
8 To  see  this,  use  the  nomnalization  rule  and  recall  that  all countries  import  all but  the  infinitesmal
number  of a-products  produced  domestically,  and  so  incurr  the  transport-cost  on (almost)  their  entire
consumption  of a-products,  which  constitute  a fraction  v of  total  expenditure.  In  addition,  consumers  in
counrites  that  are  net  importers  of ,-products  face  a c.i.f.  price  of T-p,  for their  remaining  expenditure
on P-products.
30Since a-products  are exported  in all countries,  producers  face identical  c.i.f.
and f.o.b. prices and, as a result,  Equation  (15) is still valid. However,  Equation  (16)
is only valid in countries  that export  3-products.  In countries  that import ,-products,
the producer  price  of these products  is T-p", and, as a result,  Equation  (16) has to be
replaced  by:
X. pp =w.e'  -+KPl  (26)
Straightforward  but somewhat  tedious  algebra  reveals  that the expressions
for equilibrium  prices  in Equations  (8), (17)  and (18)  still hold, provided  that we
replace  8 and 1-8 with 6. T-  and X  *  (1- 8) if the country  is a net importer  of 1-
products,  and with 8 -.  fv  and (1- 8)  *,  - 9otherwise.  1 9
While trade  patterns  are unchanged,  the world economy  with  transport  costs
exhibits  less cross-country  variation  in industrial  structures  than  the world economy
with  free trade. The higher  the transport  costs are, the lower is the price of those
industries  in which  the country  has comparative  advantage.  That is, the lower  is the
price of a-products  (3-products)  in rich  (poor)  countries.  For the reasons  mentioned
'9To derive  the  analog  to Equation  (17),  we  can  equate  the  ratio  of world  expenditure  on  the  (sum  of
all)  a-products  in  any  two  countries  to  the  ratio  of the  value  of  productions  as before.  Using  the  new
expressions  for  wages  in the  expressions  for  factor  supplies  results  in
, XO+A  -£  Xs)  a( 
Pa' = Pa  .eo+21  . Inserting  this  in  the  ideal  price  index
for the  a-industry  yields  the  appropriate  modification  of Equation  (17).  Equation  (8)  is simply  a
consequence  of our  unchanged  normalization  rule.  To  obtain  the  analog  to Equation  (18),  note  first  that
the  presence  of  transport  costs  implies  that  the  market  -clearing  conditions  in  the a- and  ,-industries
can  now  be  expressed  as equating  the  value  of world  production  at  producer  prices  to  the  value  of
world  consumption  at  consumer  prices  for all a- and  ,8-products.  Then,  using  the  analog  to Equation
(17),  the  new  expressions  for  factor  prices,  and  the  factor  supplies  we  can  equate  the  ratio  of
expenditure  in  both  industries  to  the  ratio  of  productions  at producer  prices  to  obtain  the  appropriate
modification  of  (18).
31before,  this leads  to an reduction  in the share of the  a-industry  (,3-industry)  in rich
(poor)  countries.20
Business  Cycles  and Transport  Costs
The (demeaned)  growth rate of income  is still given  by Equations  (1  1)-(12)
and (19)-(21).  Consequently,  Proposition  3 relating  the properties  of business  cycles
to a country's  industrial  structure  still holds.  However,  transport  costs reduce  the
volume  of trade and,  as a result,  the cross-sectional  dispersion  in x. This implies  that
the cross-section  of business  cycles  exhibits  less variation  in the model  with
transport  costs than in the free-trade  model.
A process  of parametric  reductions  in transport  costs has opposite  effects  on
the business  cycles  of rich  and poor countries.  If the competition  and cyclical  biases
are important,  we know that the Volatility  and Comovement  graphs  are downward
and upward  sloping  with x, respectively.  Therefore,  reductions  in transport  costs
lower  the volatility of business  cycles  in rich  countries  (as their  x increases)  and raise
volatility  in poor countries  (as their  x decreases).  Similarly,  reductions  in transport
costs make  business  cycles more  synchronized  with the world cycle in rich  countries
(as their x increases)  and less synchronized  with the world  cycle in poor countries
(as  their x decreases).
20  It is  straightforward  to  verify  this by  substituting  the  expressions  for equilibrium  wages  and
employment  into  the  definition  of  x and  differentiating  with  respect  to r.
325. Terms  of Trade  Shocks
In this section,  we develop  implications  of the theory  for the cross-section  of
the (growth  of the) terms of trade.  Often,  changes  in the terms of trade are assumed
to be exogenous  to the model,  as part of the description  of the "shocks"  to the
system.  The advantage  of a world equilibrium  model  is that it removes  this degree  of
freedom  by determining  the behavior  of the tenms  of trade  in terms of more  primitive
sources  of fluctuations.  We exploit  this feature  here  to show that the competition
and cyclical bias hypothesis  have different  implications  for how  the volatility  and
comovement  of the (growth  rate  of the) terms of trade vary  with the industrial
structure  of a country.  Although  in principle  these implications  could be used to
empirically  distinguish  between  our  two hypotheses,  a first look at the data  yields
somewhat  inconclusive  results.
Properties of the Terms of Trade
Let T(g,8,ir,-)  denote  the terms of trade of a (g,8,ir,t)-country,  defined  as the
ideal  price index of production  relative  to the ideal  price index of consumption.  We
refer  to the (detrended)  growth  rate in the terms of trade of a country  as its terms  of
trade  shock.  21 Using  the expressions  for prices  in Equations  (8) and (1  9)-(20),  this is
given  by:
dinT  - E[dInTj  = eT *d  +h  *dr  -_  * d-  *  dI  (27)
21 It is straighfforward  to  show  that  the  growth  rate  of T in (27)  is equivalent  to the  growth  rate  in  the
ideal  price  index  for exports,  weighted  by  the  share  of  exports  in income,  less  the  growth  rate  of  the
ideal  price  index  for imports  weighted  by  the  share  of imports  in  income.  We  use  this  altemative
formulation  when  we  turn  to  the  data.
33where ,T(, 7 ,  and tnT(g,j,g,,t)  measure  the sensitivity  of the growth  in the terms
of trade  to domestic  and  foreign  productivity  shocks,  while  T(g 1 ,8,n,)  and  tT(lt,8,7,)
measure  the  sensitivity  to domestic  and  foreign  monetary  shocks,  and  are  given  by
c =-x-a  *  +X  (28)
tT  1+X fI =X *  +a(x-vHFaE  -£a)  (29)
tt =XKa  0+>X  (30)
I  =X -K  -ex+(X-V)-(K  -K,)-  1+x(31)
The  intuitions  for  these  expressions  should  be  familiar.  Increases  in domestic
productivity  (decreases  in  domestic  interest  rates)  raise  the  supply  of domestically-
produced  varieties  of the a-products.  If  the  competition  bias  is present,  this  leads  to
a decline  in  their  price  as  countries  are  "large"  suppliers  in  their  export  markets,
constituting  an  adverse  terms  of trade  shock  for  the  domestic  economy.  This  is
captured  by  Equations  (28)  and  (30),  which  vanish  as O-*o°  and  the  competition
effect  disappears.  Increases  in foreign  productivity  (decreases  in  foreign  interest
rates)  raise  the  demand  for a-products  in all  countries  and  provided  that 0 is finite,
raise  their  price  as  well  (See  Equation  (17)).  This  constitutes  a favourable  terms  of
trade  shock  for  all  countries,  and  is larger  the  richer  is a country  (the  larger  is its
share of a-products  in production).  In addition,  provided  that %<ep  (<KcZ), foreign
shocks  create  an excess  demand  for  all a-products  relative  to  3-products,  leading  to
an  increase  in  the  relative  price  of all a-products  (See  Equation  (18)).  This
constitutes  a positive  (negative)  terms  of trade  shock  for net  exporters  (importers)  of
a-products  with  x>v (x<v).
34Empirical  Implications
Let VT(8L,7,r,t)  denote  the standard  deviation  of the (detrended)  growth  of the
terms of trade  of a (g,8,j,)-country, and let CT(lI,3,t,tL)  denote  its correlation  with
world  average  output  growth.  We  refer  to these  statistics  as  the  Terms  of Trade
Comovement  and  Volatility  graphs.  We  have  the  following  result:  22
PROPOSITION  4: The  functions  CT  and  VT depend,  at most,  on x. Define:
D= [(1  - a)  +(1-  )  Ka]  J
E=a-(ep-£a)~~~  ++(-  );
M = CT  -(1+X).  Iv -ea + (1V)  -p  ]  (£-8  )  ,  - ([VK  + (l-V)  K, ]  (K,  -Kc  ) 
Then,
(i)  - <0  ( aV  0)if  x<v.  E  (xŽv.  E  );and
xa-x  D+E  D+E
ac  T  ac 
(ii)  cT= 0 if x=v and  a  <(a  0)  if M  <0  (M Ž0)  for all x.
Proposition  4 shows  that the model  predicts  the Volatility  graph for the terms
E
of trade to have  a U-shaped  form, with minimum  at  v - .Since both D and E
are non-negative,  the minimum  of this function  is in the interval  [0, v]. Empirically,
one should  expect  most countries  to have  x< v, as the average  country  lies well
above the median  country  in the world  income  distribution.  Therefore,  the theory
does not impose  tight restrictions  on how a cross-section  of terms of trade shocks
would  look. If D is small relative  to E, we would  expect  most countries  to be in the
2To  prove  this,  note  first  that  VT and  CT are  identical  to  V and  C as  given  in  footnote  17,  provided  that
we  replace  the  growth  rate  sensitivities  with  the  terms  of  trade  sensitivities  given  in  (28)-(31).
Performingthissubstitution,wefindthat  VT=VD.x2 +E-(x-v)2 and
CT  =  M E.  v x  . The proposition  then describes  the signs  of
VT. jr [v.8  +(1-V).  ]2+  +  [v  ica  + (1- v).K
the  derivatives  of  these  expressions  with  respect  to  x.
35downward-sloping  region  of VT. If D is large relative  to E, we would expect  most
countries  to be in the upward-sloping  region  of VT. Interestingry,  D and E can be
loosely  interpreted  as a measure  of the strength  of the competition  and cyclical
biases  respectively.  As 0-o°,  the competition  bias becomes  irrelevant  and D  --O.  As
both se-4s.  and ;-*i,  the cyclical  bias disappears  and E  -O.  Note  that, for E  -O  it is
necessary  that both  shocks  have small cyclical  biases.  If, for instance, C»>>e,  and
c«<<1ca,  the country  as a whole might  not exhibit  a strong  cyclical  bias and yet E
could  be quite large.
Proposition  4 also shows  that the Comovement  graph  for the terms of trade
is upward-sloping  if M>O  and downward-sloping  if M<O.  Since C  T=0 if x=v, it follows
that, if M>O,  changes  in the terms of trade  are positively  correlated  with the world
cycle in rich  countries,  and negatively  in poor countries.  If M<O,  the opposite  is true.
If M=O,  the Comovement  graph for the terms of trade be flat at zero. Note  that M
could be  zero if the cyclical  bias is small  for both  shocks,  i.e. SFi,oa  and K-Ka.
Altematively,  M could be small  even if the cyclical  biases  of both  shocks  are large
but offsetting,  i.e. if s_,>>c.  and  ic,<<i  or s,<<«s  and K>>Ka.
Turning  to the data, Figure  3 plots  the volatility  and comovement  of the
growth  rate of the terms of trade against  the log-level  of income  for a subset  of
countries  we used  to construct  Figure  1 (See  also Table 2).  Figure  3 suggests  that
changes  in the terms of trade  are less  volatile  in rich  countries  than in poor ones,
and  that changes  in the terms of trade  are more or less  equally  correlated  with the
world  cycle in rich and poor countries.  If one is willing  to assume  that the theory  is
approximately  correct,  one could  read the top panel  of Figure  3 as indicating  that
E>>D,  while the lower  panel  would  show  that M =0. These restrictions  are consistent
with  the notion  that the cyclical  biases  are large (E>>D)  but go in different  directions
for different  shocks  (M  =0).
However,  this neither  rules  out nor  confirms  whether  the cyclical bias is more
important  than the competition  bias in shaping  the cross-section  of business  cycles.
36On the one hand, one could point to the condition  that E>>D  to support  the view that
the cyclical  bias is more  important  than  the competition  bias.  On the other hand,  one
could  stress that E>>D  does not necessarily  mean  that D is small in absolute  value,
and use the condition  M=O  to argue  that the competition  bias is more important  than
the cyclical  bias. In any  case, given our  very crude measures  of the terms of trade,
we are reluctant  to use Figure  3 to draw sharp conclusions  regarding  the relative
importance  of our two hypotheses.
376. Concluding  Remarks
We have  developed  two altemative  explanations  of the main features  of the
cross-section  of business  cycles.  Both  explanations  rely on the observation  that the
law of comparative  advantage  leads  rich countries  to specialize  in "high-tech"
products  produced  by skilled  workers,  while poor countries  specialize  in "low-tech"
products  produced  by unskilled  workers.  To the extent  that "high-tech"  and "low-
tech" industries  respond  differently  to domestic  and foreign shocks,  business  cycles
depend  on the industrial  structure  of a country  and,  as a result,  have different
properties  in rich  and poor countries.  We have  focused on two such  asymmetries:
the competition  bias and the cyclical  bias.
Our work  suggests  some  natural  avenues  for further research.  On the
empirical  front,  the theory  developed  here provides  a rich set of testable  predictions
regarding  the connection  between  the industrial  structure  of a country  and the
nature  of the business  cycles  that it experiences.  To investigate  the empirical  validity
of these  predictions,  one would  have  to first identify asymmetries  in how industries
react  to domestic  and foreign  shocks.  With this evidence  in hand, it would  then be
possible  to quantify  the extent  to which cross-country  differences  in industry
structure  contribute  to cross-country  differences  in the properties  of business  cycles.
On the theoretical  front,  it is natural  to ask how the possibility  of cross-border
trade  in financial  instruments  affects  the shape  of the cross-section  of business
cycles.  In the models  presented  here,  the price of consumption  in different  dates
and  states of nature  varies across  countries,  creating  an incentive  for the
establishment  of an intemational  financial  market  that redistributes  consumption
across  dates  and states.  However,  since neither  factor supplies  nor their
productivities  depend  on consumption,  a redistribution  of the latter  cannot affect
output,  although  it certainly  would  affect  consumption.  If we want  to construct  an
argument  relating  financial  integration  to the shape of a cross-section  of business
38cycles,  we need to link factor supplies  and their productivities  to consumption.  One
way achieve  this is to modify  preferences  so as to introduce  income  effects  on the
labour  supply.  In our opinion,  a preferred  option  would  be to allow  workers  and firms
to invest  in skills and technology,  and then study how  trade in financial  instruments,
by affecting  these investments,  combines  with commodity  trade in shaping  the
cross-section  of business  cycles.
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The  top panel  plots the standard  deviation  of the grovwth  rate  of real  per capita  GDP (diny)  over the period
1960-1994  against  the log-level  of average  per capita  GDP  in 1985  PPP dollars  over the same  period
(Iny),  for a sample  of 88 counteies.  The bottom  panel  plots  the correlation  ot real  per capita  GDP  growth
with  world average  per capita  GDP  growth.  excluding  the country  in question  (dInY)  over  the period  1960-
1994  against  the log-level  of average  per capita  GDP  over  the same  period. All data are  at annual
frequenoy.  The  sample  consists  of all non-OPEC  market  eoonomies  with at least 30 observations  on per
capita  income (RGDPCH)  beginning  in 1960 in the Penn  World  Tables  Version  5.6, extended  to 1994
using  constant  price local  ourrency growth  rates  from the World  Bank  World  Tables.Figure 2: Sample Paths  of the Productivity Index
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The  top panel  plots  the standard  deviation  of  the growth  rate  of terms of  trade (dInT)  over  the period 1960-
1994  against  the log-level  of average  per  capita  GDP in 1985  PPP dollars  over  the same  period  (Iny),  for a
sample  of 63 countries.  The bottom  panel  plots the correlation  of the growth  rate  of the terms of trade  with
world  average  per  capita GDP  growth  excluding  the country  in question  (dInY)  over  the period  1960-1994
against  the log-level  of average  per  capita  GDP over  the same  period. All data are  at annual  frequency.
Terms  of trade growth  is defined  as the growth  rate  of the national  accounts  local  currency  export  deflator
times the share of exports  in GDP  at constant  local  currency  prices,  less  the growth rate  of the
corresponding  import  deflator  times  the share  of imports  in GDP. The sample  consists  of all countries
with complete  time series  on these  variables  in the World  Bank  World  Tables over  the period 1960-1994.
Five  countries  for which  terms of trade  volatility  was more  than  two standard  deviations  above  the mean
for all countries  were  dropped  from the sample  (Argentina,  Zambia,  Israel,  Bolivia  and Nicaragua).Table 1: Volatility  and Comovement
Volatility  Comovement
(Standard  deviation  of real  (Correlation  of real per
per capita  GDP Growth)  capita GDP growth  with
world average  excluding
country  in question)
Average  Correlation  Average  Correlation
with ln(per  with ln(per
capita GDP)  capita GDP)
Full  Sample  .051  -.621  .240  .627
(88 countries,  1960-94)
Full  Sample,  Non-Oil  .050  -.624  .264  .539
Shock  years
(88 countries,  1960-72,
1976-78,1982-94)
Full  Sample,  using  --  --  .259  .440
unweighted  world
average  growth
Full  Sample,  using  .097  -.431  .525  .428
deviations  from linear
trend instead  of growth
rates
Top Quartile  by Income  .031  -.573  .496  .425
Second  Quartile  .050  -.407  .260  .430
Third Quartile  .051  -.094  .140  .297
Bottom  Quartile  .074  -.144  .066  .238
Note:  See  notes  to Figure  1.Table 2: Volatility  and Comovement
of the Terms of Trade
Volatility  Comovement
(Standard  deviation  of  (Correlation  of terms of
terms of trade growth)  trade  growth  with world
average  excluding  country
in question)
Average  Correlation  Average  Correlation
with ln(per  with ln(per
capita GDP)  capita GDP)
Full Sample  .054  -.420  .054  .095
(63  countries,  1960-92)
Full Sample,  Non-Oil  .051  -.416  .044  -.257
Shock  years
(63 countries,  1960-72,
1976-78,1982-92)
Full Sample,  using  --  --  .072  -.338
unweighted  world
average  growth
Full Sample,  using  .066  -.387  .211  -.330
deviations  from linear
trend instead  of growth
rates*
Top Quartile  by Income  .015  -.153  .072  -.563
Second  Quartile  .068  -.299  .074  .202
Third Quartile  .069  .238  .053  -.263
Bottom  Quartile  .074  -.048  .006  .038
Note:  See  notes  to Figure  3.
* For  this  row  only,  the  level  of  the  termns  of  trade  is  defined  as  a geometric  average  of  the  import  and
export  deflators,  using  the  export  and  import  shares  in  GDP  as  weights.Policy Research Working Paper Series
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